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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WERNER KIEPE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant and 
Cross Respondent, 
vs. 
' ELI D. LECHEMINANT, 
Defendant-Respondent and 
Cross Appellant. 
Case No. 
10767 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF AND 
BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL 
1 Appeal from the judgment of the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable Marcellus 
K. Snow, Judge. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action involving the operation of a 
partnership business for a period of thirteen months 
covering the period of time between the dissolution 
of the partnership and the final winding up of the 
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partnership business between Appellant and Re-
spondent. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE IN 
LOWER COURT 
Respondent agrees with the disposition of the 
case in the Lower Court as stated by Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts 
related by Appellant with the following exception: 
It is presumed that Appellant intended to use 
the word Appellant in the last paragraph of page 4, 
line 5 of his brief. 
Respondent does not agree with the statement 
of overcharges to customers made by Respondent. 
Were this appeal from the final judgment, then that 
part of the Appellant's statement of facts pertain-
ing to the original case resulting in the judgment 
of March 12, 1964 not herein objected to might be 
in order, but the only record of the case on which 
this appeal is taken is that made subsequent to the 
judgment entered March 12, 1964. To go behind this 
record is unimportant and simply confuses the facts 
as to the real issue on this appeal. 
Appellant states that the partners continued to 
operate the business of the partnership in the same 
manner they had done prior to notice of dissolution. 
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In this we do not fully agree. The fact as shown by 
the record is that while the partners continued on 
in the same office, Appellant took into his posses-
sion and under his control, the appraisal business 
and records, claiming those assets as his own and 
not partnership assets and Appellant conducted his 
own independent appraisal business, he did not in-
tend that Respondent participate in the income, 
therefrom. Respondent carried on the mortgage loan 
and insurance business of the partnership, as a part-
nership operation from which Appellant at all times 
participated in the income just as Appellant did 
prior to the dissolution of the partnership. Appellant 
put no time into partnership operation but Appel-
lant devoted the whole of his time to his appraisal 
business. The only question before the court is what 
is the equitable basis under which the parties oper-
ated for a period of thirteen months, from the date 
of dissolution through the winding up period to 
the final breaking off date. The attention of the 
court is directed to the fact that this phase of the 
case was not made an issue by the pleadings. Con-
trary to the contention of Appellant the trial court 
did retain jurisdiction, after having entered its judg-
ment on the case for the purpose of settling the con-
troversy which had arisen between the parties as to 
the thirteen month period of time when the parties 
could not resolve their differences. The Order from 
which the appeal is taken was initiated not by any 
pleadings but upon application of Respondent for an 
Order to Show Cause why Appellant should not be 
found in contempt of court for having failed to com-
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ply with the judgment of the court which was made 
and entered on March 12, 1964. At this hearing, on 
Respondent's application, no pleadings were filed but 
both parties initiated the matter of accountings for 
the thirteen month period subsequent to the date of 
dissolution. 
The attention of the court is directed to the fact 
that when the trial court stated that no compen-
sation would be allowed either party for services 
during the thirteen month period, the court had not 
considered nor allowed compensation to be paid to 
Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen, and charged as 
a partnership expense, neither had the court allowed 
compensation to Appellants accountant, Mr. Pin-
nock, as a partnership expense. 
At page 6 of Appellant's Brief Appellant states 
that at the conclusion of the evidence, the purport of 
the evidence was discussed with counsel, during 
which counsel for Respondent makes the following 
statement: 
I said if they would be willing to invoke 
the partnership agreement all the way down 
the line, we would be willing to do that. But 
they want to omit the renewal insurance and 
that means that much more disadvantage to 
us. (R. 244) 
The Court then stated: 
All right. The Court will adopt the sugges-
tion of Mr. Backman that we go all the w.aY 
down the line** *. Neither partner will receive 
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any special compensation /or services during 
this interim period, and all of the expenses by 
whichever department incurred or by whom 
will be lumped together and deducted from the 
profit and loss account, if there is sufficient 
in there, and the balance shall be distributed 
equally between the partners. I won't need to 
take it under advisement, and you can proceed 
accordingly and wind up today if you want. 
(R. 245) 
The difficulty is that the court did not invoke 
the partnership agreement all the way down the line 
in that the court allowed the compensation paid to 
Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen to be charged as 
partnership expense. The partnership agreement 
provided that mutual consent of the partners was 
necessary to employ anyone on behalf of the part-
nership (R. 174). The Respondent told Appellant 
that he would not pay Ruth Barlow if Appellant 
employed her. 
It is to be noted that no objection was made to 
the introduction of evidence introduced by Respond-
ent at the hearing had on February 13, 1964 as to 
special services rendered by Respondent during the 
winding up period in Respondents having preserved 
the mortgage loan asset of the partnership (R. 164-
175). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE JUDGMENT THAT DEFENDANT IS 
AWARDED THE SUM OF $2,500.00 FOR SERV-
6 
ICES FOR A PERIOD OF THIRTEEN MONTHS 
SUBSEQUENT TO DATE OF DISSOLUTION 
OF THE PARTNERSHIP IN PRESERVING 
THE MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET OF THE PART-
NERSHIP IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
The action is an equitable action, and contrary 
to the argument of Appellant that the court had no 
evidence to support its order, the court did hear evi-
dence and had theretofore indicated to counsel that · 
it intended to award some compensation to Respond- I 
ent for his having preserved the mortgage loan asset 
of the partnership, and having retained jurisdiction : 
of the case, the case having been tried piece meal, 
the court exercised its equitable powers in entering ~ 
its order allowing compensation to Respondent for 
his services rendered, particularly when the court 
allowed compensation to be paid to Ruth Barlow and 
R. L. Christensen to be charged as partnership ex-
penses. Therefore an appeal from the ruling is not 
in order, nor is the order appealed from an appeal-
able order. 
Appellant cannot come into a court of equity 
and seek to avail himself of the benefits of that part 
of an order beneficial to him and object to that part 
of the order which is not beneficial to him, which 
it is apparent Appellant seeks to do, this especially 
when he is faced with the same omission, if there is 
an omission, as that complained of. Here the comt 
awarded, and charged against the partnership in· 
come, the salary of a clerk whom Respondent had 
discharged and who had been rehired by Appellant. 
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after Respondent had stated to Appellant that if he 
reemployed the party discharged Appellant would 
be required to pay her salary; and a clerk whom Ap-
pellant brought into his employment to learn the 
business, after dissolution, one who had never been 
an employee of the partnership; none of this is sup-
ported by pleadings. 
Respondent finds no fault with the authorities 
cited and relied upon by Appellant, but they are not 
applicable to this case. 
Appellant points out the fact that the court 
adopted the recommendation of Respondent in order-
ing that all income received by each party from 
January 1, 1963 to February 1, 1964 is to be distrib-
1 uted in the same manner and as is provided by the 
partnership agreement and as has heretofore been 
received and distributed, and that neither partner 
will receive any compensation for services during 
this interim period. It is evident however that when 
such recommendation was made by Respondent's 
1 counsel it was assuming that the partnership agree-
ment if invoked, would be invoked in all aspects. 
This would require the consent of Respondent to the 
employment of those not employed by the partner-
ship. Thus Respondent would be protected and would 
not be compelled to pay one-half the salary of such 
employees. (See R. 83) 
POINT TWO 
THE ISSUE UPON WHICH THE AWARD 
OF $2,500.00 TO THE RESPONDENT BY THE 
8 
JUDGMENT OF JUNE 27, 1966 WAS TRIED ON 
FEBRUARY 13, 1964, AND WAS ADJUDGED 1 
AGAINST THE RESPONDENT BY THE JUDG-
MENT OF MARCH 12, 1964, WHICH JUDG-
MENT HAD BECOME FINAL AND WAS RES 
JUDICATA OF SAID ISSUE AT THE TIME OF 
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENTS OF NOVEMBER 
9, 1964, AND OF JUNE 27, 1966. NO MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL OR MOTION TO BE RE-
LIEVED OF SAID JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 
1964, HAS EVER BEEN FILED, NOW NEARLY 
THREE YEARS SINCE IT WAS ENTERED. 
Appellant bases this argument on the ground 
that the award made by the court to Respondent was 
an issue, it was not made an issue by any pleading 
but was simply an announcement by a court of 
equity in its arriving at a settlement of a dispute 
arising after the court had rendered judgment, and 
when the court retained jurisdiction of the case to 
settle the dispute. It is evident that Appellant would 
take advantage of his having led Respondent into 
believing that Appellant's net income was consider-
ably more than Appellant later showed his net in-
come to be, and in counsels reliance on such repre-
sentation and counsels recommending to the court 
that which he considered a fair division of income 
and expenses, which recommendation the court 
adopted. Respondent later found when the true facts 
were made known, which facts were much different 
from those represented by Appellant, that not only 
would Respondent sustain a substantial loss from 
participating in any income of Appellant but Re-
spondent would expose his income to ridiculously 
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high operation costs resulting in a much different 
award than had been anticipated. 
Appellant testified as to the fact as follows: 
Altogether I've had $28,825.00 of total 
appraisal work finished so that my income 
for 1963 amounts to over $30,000.00, to Mr. 
LeCheminant's $8,900.00. This is the problem 
we each have half of that 50-50. But I have 
against that some $10,000.00 personal ex-
penses which I have paid. (R. 93) 
Appellant did not deny having made such rep-
resentations as is evidenced by the following testi-
mony (R. 106, Vol. 2): 
Q. Do you recall, Mr. Kiepe, in the trial 
of this case the question arose as to what you 
would estimate your income for 1963 and 
January of '64, would be? And the expendi-
tures against that for the earning of it? If I 
remember correctly you stated that it would 
be approximately $28,000.00 income with ex-
penditures of about $10,000.00 against that? 
A. Well, I remember being asked the ques-
tion, and I did make some estimates, but now 
I have the true and actual facts, item by 
item. 
In reliance on this representation, and assum-
ing there would be close to $20,000.00 go into the 
partnership account through Appellant's earnings, 
the above referred to recommendation was made 
by Respondent's counsel. It is evident that the court 
<'onsidered there would be sufficient income realized 
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by Respondent from Appellant's earnings to offset 
any additional award which the court had therefore 
indicated it would make to Respondent for his serv-
ices in preserving the assets of the partnership rep-
resented by the mortgage loan business. The court 
realizing the inequity resulting, and to correct this 
inequitable situation stated that as it had retained 
jurisdiction of the case it made the ward of $2,-
500.00. 
The evidence shows the difficulty Respondent 
faced in compelling Appellant to render an account-
ing of his earnings as ordered by the court, and in 
Appellant, each time the matter was brought before 
the court, furnishing a different account, finally 
forcing Respondent to obtain an Order To Show 
Cause. 
POINT THREE 
THE FINDING OF FACT CONTAINED IN 
PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
THAT EACH PARTY IS ENTITLED TO $535.00 
BONUS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A WORD OF 
PLEADINGS NOR BY ONE WORD OF EVI-
DENCE OR ANY OTHER PROOF, AND AS AP-
PLIED IN THE JUDGMENT WOULD GIVE 
RESPONDENT $535.00 TOO MUCH AND AP-
PELLANT $535.00 TOO LITTLE. 
This point is predicated entirely upon an ac-
counting principal which the court considered. Ap-
pellant had, according to his accounting submitted, 
received his revised bonuses over and above the 50% 
11 
awarded in the original judgment and the court, in 
order to place both parties on the same bonus basis 
awarded this item to Respondent. 
POINT FOUR 
THAT PORTION OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF 
THE JUDGMENT WHICH READS: "* * * AS 
MODIFIED UNDER WHICH IT IS DETER-
MINED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS EN-
TITLED TO THE SUM OF $16,433.22 OUT OF 
THE CASH ON HAND OF $28,723.98" IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The same is true of this item as that item under 
Point III. This is arrived at out of the accounting 
submitted not by Respondent but by Appellant. The 
trial court being an accountant himself concluded 
this was a correct interpretation of the account. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
OF MARCH 12, 1964. 
Appellant is most inconsistent in his position 
on the whole of this case, in arguing under Point II 
that the award of $2,500.00 made by the court is 
res adjudicata, then under this point Appellant 
would go back of the judgment which was entered on 
March 12, 1964, and he assigns as error the court's 
refusal to correct that which appellant contends was 
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a typographical mistake many months after th 
judgment had been entered. True counsel for R~ 
spondent did state that if there were an error h 
would consent to its being corrected, but after con 
sulting with Respondent it was determined that n 
error existed. The court did not refuse to correc 
an apparent error as Appellant would have this Hon 
orable court believe. 
That which the court did was to suggest to coun 
sel if an error appeared, to request the court to cm 
rect same. Respondent found no error as chargec 
POINT SIX 
THE STATEMENT CONTAINED IN THl 
TH IR D UNNUMBERED PARAGRAPH 01 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 01 
LAW ARE FALSE AND ARE NOT SUPPORTEI 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellant charges Respondent with havini 
falsely caused the court to make a finding that bot! 
parties requested the court to retain jurisdiction o 
the case to adjudicate the rights and obligation: 
of each party during the thirteen month winding UJ 
period. We submit that the record of the case clearl~ 
shows that the court did retain jurisdiction, that ni 
objection to the offering of evidence was made b~ 
Appellant but on the contrary, Appellant took par 
in the trial as the same applied to the winding llJ 
period, all of which reflects the fact that the charg1 
of falsely stating facts as made by Appellant is mos 
unfair. 
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CROSS APPEAL OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order made and en-
tered on November 9th, 1964 awarding Respondent 
the sum of $2,500.00 for preserving the mortgage loan 
assets of a partnership when Respondent had asked 
for $5,000.00; from the award under said order of 
compensation to Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen 
as partnership expense; from a charge against Re-
spondent of $400.00 ( 1h of $800.00) fee charged by 
Appellant's accountant and in awarding Respondent 
out of funds on hand the sum of $16,433.32 when 
Respondent was entitled to an amount in excess of 
said sum. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE IN 
LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered an Order on November 
9th, 1964 which provided among other things: 
1. That the Respondent be awarded $2,500.00 
for "preserving the mortgage loan assets of the part-
nership." 
2. That a bonus of $535.00 be awarded to each 
of the parties. 
3. Adjudging that the Respondent is entitled 
to total credits of $20,101.93, less refunds of $3,-
668.71. 
4. Adjudging that the Respondent is entitled 
to net credits of $16,443.22. 
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5. Adjudging that compensation paid to Ruth 
Barlow and R. L. Christensen should be allowed as 
partnership expense and be borne equally by the part. 
ners. 
6. Adjudging that the fee charged by Lawrence 
S. Pinnock, Certified Public Accountant, should be a 
partnership expense and borne equally by the part-
ners. 
7. A warding Respondent a net balance credit 
of $16,433.22 out of cash on hand of $28, 723.90. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL 
Cross Appellant seeks reversal of the above por-
tions of the Judgment or Order dated November 9, 
1964 and judgment in his favor as follows, to-wit: 
1. Awarding to Respondent (Cross Appellant) 
the sum of $5,000.00 for Respondent's services in 
preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partner- ' 
ship. 1
1 
I 
2. Adjudging that the compensation paid to , 
Ruth Barlow is not an expense of the partnership ; 
and should be borne by Appellant. 
3. Adjudging that the compensation paid to R. i 
L. Christensen is not an expense of the partnership i 
and should be borne by Appellant. 
4. Adjudging that the fee paid Lawrence S. 
Pinnock is not an expense of the partnership and 
should be borne by Appellant. 
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5. Awarding to Respondent out of the cash on 
hand of the partnership, the sum of $22,093.22 being 
the sum of $16,433.22 awarded, plus one-half the 
compensation of Ruth Barlow of $2,550.00 or $1,-
275.00; one-half the compensation of R. L. Christen-
sen of $2,970.00 or $1,485.00; one-half the fee paid 
to Lawrence S. Pinnock of $800.00 or $400.00, and 
an additional $2,500.00 for services in preserving 
the mortgage loan asset of the partnership. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cross Appellant and Cross Respondent entered 
into a written partnership agreement the business 
of which partnership commenced under said agree-
ment on October 1, 1943 (R. 3), which provided 
among other things that each partner should work 
for the partnership on a basis of a salesman's com-
mission, which should be 50 % of any commissions 
accruing from the listings, sale, rental, or appraisal 
of real estate, or from insurance commissions. That 
the partnership should be on a 50-50 basis as to 
costs and profits. That disbursements from a joint 
checking account shall be made over the signature 
of both partners, and that neither partner will incur 
an obligation in the name of the partnership in ex-
cess of $10.00 without first obtaining the approval 
of the other partner. That the agreement as to per-
centage of division of commission was later orally 
amended which is unimportant on this cross-appeal. 
Cross Respondent served written notice of dis-
solution of the partnership upon Cross Appellant on 
16 
December 30, 1962, to become effective February ! 
1, 1963. The partners continued to conduct business 
at the same location, under the same firm name · 
' with some of the same employees, sharing the part. 
nership office in the same manner after February 
1, 1963 as before. Cross Appellant who had, prior 
1 
to dissolution for many years, managed the mortgage 
loan business of the partnership, and who recognized 
this business as an asset of the partnership, con-
tinued to manage this business of the partnership 
in the same manner as he had done previous to the 
dissolution, but Cross Respondent carried on his 
appraisal business, spending no time whatsoever 
in the mortgage loan business of the partnership; 
this relationship continued for a period of thirteen 
months after February 1, 1963. The parties were 
unable to agree on a division of assets, and in the 
winding up of the partnership business, as a result 
Cross Respondent filed action against Cross Appel-
lant for an accounting which resulted in a judgment 
entered by the court on March 12, 1964. Neither 
party to the action had by any pleading asked for 
a determination of the rights of the parties during 
the thirteen month period subsequent to the cutting 
off date of the partnership as of February 1, 1963. 
When the parties were unable to agree on an equit-
able division of income and expenses during this 
thirteen month period the parties sought the aid 
of the court to settle this controversy, which the comi 
did and which resulted in the Order herein appealed 
from. 
17 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING 
CROSS APPELLANT THE SUM OF $5,000.00 
WHICH WAS THE SUM ASKED BY CROSS AP-
PELLANT FOR HIS EFFORTS AND SERVICE 
DURING THE LAST THIRTEEN MONTHS IN 
PRESERVING THE MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET 
OF THE PARTNERSHIP. 
It is evident from the testimony of Cross Ap-
pellant that at the time notice of dissolution of the 
partnership was served on him there was nearly 
seven million dollars of mortgage loan business han-
dled by Cross Appellant for the partnership; that 
there were some 600 accounts which required some 
service every month in order to keep the accounts 
current. This business was carried on by Cross Ap-
pellant for the thirteen month period. As the mort-
gage loan account could have been cancelled by the 
mortgage loan company because of the dissolution, 
it was important that extra effort be made to service 
these accounts in a creditable manner, which was 
done by Cross Appellant. 
As a result of the service performed by Cross 
Appellant, this asset which it is evident was a very 
valuable one was preserved. Cross Appellant testi-
fied in detail to the service rendered by him in 
preserving this asset, ( R. 13-25, Vol. 2). Cross Re-
spondent benefited through these services of Cross 
Appellant and received his share of the profits from 
this operation while at the same time Cross Re-
18 
spondent devoted the whole of his time to hiE 
praisal business; not partnership business. 
The sum of $5,000.00 asked for by Cross 
pellant was most modest and should have beei 
lowed by the court. 
This case might be likened to one where irn 
of Cross Respondent remaining in the same o 
and conducting his private business therefron 
takes a trip to Hawaii for a period of thii 
months during which time Cross Appellant ca 
on the partnership business. We think Cross 
spondent would make no objection to an allow 
by the court for Cross Appellant's services dt 
that time. This case is no different. Or it is like 
case where Cross Respondent might have died, Vi 
his interest passes to his estate and Cross Appe 
carries on the business. Such was the holding ii 
case of Puffer v. Morton, 168 Wis. 366, 170 
368, 5 ALR 1288 involving a law partnership " 
one of the partners died and the firm had on : 
no contingent fee cases but all business held 1 
was on the usual general retainer basis wher 
clients could have dispensed with the servicf 
the firm. The court said : 
Neither can it be said that the condrn 
to a conclusion of law business on hand a 
time of the death of a partner is simJ 
winding up of the partnership. It is more 
that, it is a continuation of business afte 
partnership has ceased to exist. Often 
continuation may require years of hard, 
for completion. Hence it is not equitable 
19 
the estate of a deceased partner which has 
contributed nothing towards such work should 
share in its compensation. Citing Rowell v. 
Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 99 N.W. 473. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COM-
PENSATION PAID TO RUTH BARLOW AS A 
PARTNERSHIP EXPENSE TO BE B 0 RN E 
EQUALLY BY THE PARTNERS. THIS ITEM 
AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF $2,550.00. 
Cross Appellant discharged Ruth Barlow short-
ly before February 1, 1963, and after some period 
of time Cross Respondent rehired her. It is evident 
from the testimony in the record that Ruth Barlow 
devoted the greater part of her time not to partner-
ship business, but in reviewing records and accounts 
in an effort to make out a case against Cross Appel-
lant on behalf of Cross Respondent. Her services 
were not needed by the partnership, neither were 
her services required in the winding up of the busi-
ness of the partnership. At the time Cross Respond-
ent rehired Ruth Barlow, Cross Appellant told Cross 
Respondent that if he hired Ruth, Cross Appellant 
would be required to pay her salary, that Cross Ap-
pellant would not, nor would he consent to the 
partnership paying same. Even when Cross Ap-
pellant signed salary checks for Ruth Barlow he 
advised Cross Respondent that he would look to the 
amount to come out of and be charged to the account 
of Cross Respondent. 
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The evidence shows by Exhibit 22, that on Feb-
ruary 5, 1963, Cross Appellant addressed a letter to 
Cross Respondent which is in part as follows: 
Now concerning Ruth. I will not agree to 
increasing the overhead in any way during 
the period of the partnership dissolution. I ' 
told Ruth the day she went to the hospital of 
the dissolution and that I would call her as 
soon as this problem was resolved. At the pres- , 
ent time we do not need more than a part time i 
girl. Linda is doing in a half day all the work 1 
done by Ruth in a full day. If you insist on 1 
rehiring Ruth before the dissolution is com- i 
plete you should pay her salary. I invoke the 
terms of the partnership agreement on this 
point. 
If we apply the provisions of Section 48-1-27 ; 
UCA 1953 which is as follows: 
PARTNERSHIP NOT TERMINATED BY 
DISSOLUTION. 
On dissolution a partnership is not ter-
minated, but continues until the winding up 
of partnership affairs is completed. 
Cross Respondent had no right to reemploy Ruth 
Barlow inasmuch as the provisions of the partner· 
ship agreement continued in force until dissolution 
under the above quoted section. 
The partnership agreement as to the right t-0 
incur obligations by eithe1· partner on behalf of the 
partnership provides that neither partner will incur 
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an obligation in the name of the partnership in ex-
cess of $10.00, without obtaining the approval of the 
other partner. 
If it should be contended that the partnership 
agreement is not in force after dissolution and dur-
ing the winding up period, then Cross Respondent 
cannot claim this item as an expense inasmuch as 
Cross Respondent had not shown in any respect that 
Ruth Barlow's services were required in the wind-
ing up process of the partnership, or to complete 
transactions begun but not finished as provided by 
Section 48-1-30 UCA 1953 which read as follows: 
Except as far as may be necessary to wind 
up partnership affairs or to complete transac-
tions begun but not then finished, d'issolution 
terminates all authority of any partner to act 
for the partnership. 
Therefore Cross Respondent cut off all author-
ity to employ Ruth Barlow or anyone else, unless 
agreed to by Cross Appellant, by his having served 
notice of dissolution on Cross Appellant. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COM-
MISSION PAID TOR. L. CHRISTENSEN AS A 
PARTNERSHIP EXPENSE TO BE BORNE 
EQUALLY BY THE PARTNERS, THIS ITEM 
AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF $2,970.00. 
R. L. Christensen was never an employee of the 
partnership. He was employed by Cross Respondent 
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subsequent to dissolution to learn the business. It is 
1 
evident that Mr. Christensen did not take the place 
of another employee of the partnership and the rec- 1 
ord contains not a word of evidence that the services . 
of Mr. Christensen were necessary in the winding up 
1 
of the business of the partnership. Cross Respondent , 
was never consulted nor did he at any time consent 
to the employment of Mr. Christensen. 
For the same reasons as argued under Point II, 
this charge against the partnership is not proper. t 
There are no pleadings or findings to support I 
either this award or that under Point II. i 
POINT IV 
I 
THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE • 
FEE OF LA WREN CE S. PINNOCK, CERTIFIED 
1 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, AS A PARTNERSHIP 
E X P E N S E , PAID FROM PARTNERSHIP 
FUNDS AND BORNE EQUALLY BY THE PART·· 
NERS. THIS ITEM AMOUNTS TO THE SUM i 
OF $800.00. I 
I 
After Cross Appellant had objected to several • 
accountings furnished to Cross Respondent, Cross 
Respondent engaged the services of Mr. Pinnock to 1 
examine accounts, not of the partnership, or of Cross , 
Appellant, but accounts, items of which reflected the , 
earnings of Cross Respondent during the thirteen 
month period subsequent to the February 1, 1963 
date. Cross Appellant did not consent to, nor did he 
agree at any time that he would pay any part of · 
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the fee paid to Mr. Pinnock. For the same reasons 
as relied upon under Points II and III this is not 
a proper charge against the partnership. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING 
THAT CROSS APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO 
RECEIVE THE SUM OF $16,433.22 OUT OF THE 
CASH ON HAND OF $28, 723.98. 
This item results in the assumption that the 
Cross Appeal of Cross Appellant will be favorable 
to Cross Appellant on all points relied upon, in which 
case the award to Cross Appellant should be $22,-
093.22 and not the sum of $16,433.22 awarded to 
Cross Appellant by the Order appealed from. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent and Cross Appellant submits 
that the law and the evidence requires: 
That the Order appealed from by Appellant be 
affirmed except as to those Points on which Cross 
Appellant assigns as errors in the following particu-
lars: 
(a) That Cross Appellant be awarded the sum 
of $5,000.00 for services rendered by him in the 
preservation of the mortgage loan asset of the part-
nPrshi p. 
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(b) That the allowance of compensation paid 
to Ruth Barlow as a partnership expense to be borne 
equally by the partners be set aside. 
( c) That the allowance of compensation paid to 
R. L. Christensen as a partnership expense to be 
borne equally by the partners be set aside. 
( d) That the allowance of fee of Lawrence S. 
Pinnock, as a partnership expense be set aside. 
( e) That the finding that Cross Appellant is 
entitled to receive the sum of $16,433.22 out of the 
cash on hand of $28, 723.98 be set aside, and that 
Cross Appellant be awarded the sum of $22,093.22 
out of said sum. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN 
AND CLARK 
1111 Deseret Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
and Cross Appellant 
